Why Does the American Form of Government Work? Jeffrey Hong

Why does the American form of government work?

Definitionally, it is difficult to observe whether a form of government "works" or does not work. There is no measure of efficacy for how well a government benefits or harms its citizens. Rather, a working government is a sort of binary: either there is stability or there is not. In that sense, the American form of government has not collapsed into anarchy; therefore, its republican system must work somehow.

Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers #10:
 As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

Madison basically structures an ideal government as one that moves on the opinions of the people. In practice, a republican system can never guarantee that all opinions have equal merit. Look no further than the electoral college, particularly the 2000 presidential election, where a majority of Americans can vote for a candidate for the presidency and still have their opinions quashed. Even if the voice of the minority wasn't silenced through binary decisions, the fact that Al Gore wasn't elected president contradicts the protection of opinion that Madison portrays.

Either Madison or Hamilton continues in the Papers, #51.

There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.

The author essentially presents two views, one of which explains the methods the US government can use in order to function. Ideally, the views of minorities are allowed to come forth. Although in some cases this does not happen, minority policy can be passed. Compromise is essential to the functioning of the government; as long as the idea presented in #51 holds strong, the United States government will represent, albeit unequally, different areas of the population.